Ambiguity aversion in standard and extended Ellsberg frameworks: alpha-maxmin versus maxmin preferences by Ravanelli, Claudia & Svindland, Gregor
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294514 
Ambiguity Aversion in Ellsberg Frameworks∗
Claudia Ravanelli† Gregor Svindland‡
October 27, 2015
Abstract
We study optimal portfolio choice and equilibrium asset prices induced by α-
maxmin expected utility (α-MEU) models. In the standard Ellsberg framework we
prove that α-MEU preferences are equivalent to either maxmin, maxmax or subjec-
tive expected utility (SEU). We show how ambiguity aversion impacts equilibrium asset
prices, and revisit the laboratory experimental findings in Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guar-
naschelli, and Zame (2010). Only when there are three or more ambiguous states the
α-MEU, maxmin, maxmax and SEU models induce different portfolio choices. We sug-
gest criteria to discriminate among these models in laboratory experiments. Finally,
we find that ambiguity seeking α-MEU agents may prevent the existence of market
equilibrium. Our results indicate that ambiguity matters for portfolio choice and does
not wash out in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades the impact of Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921), or ambiguity,
on financial decision making has received significant attention in the academic community.
Models with ambiguity averse agents can capture a variety of empirical phenomena such as
non-participation, portfolio inertia and excess volatility of asset returns.1 These models are
also supported by experimental laboratory evidence that agents’ preferences are heteroge-
neous and well approximated by ambiguity averse preferences; e.g., Bossaerts et al. (2010),
and Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2014).
The maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) has been the pioneer-
ing and workhorse model to study the impact of ambiguity aversion on financial markets.
One limitation of the model is that it does not allow for a distinction between ambiguity
and ambiguity aversion.2 The α-maxmin expected utility (α-MEU) model, defined in (2.1),
generalizes the maxmin model and has a number of appealing features.3 Fixing the set of
priors to be the one that describes the uncertainty of the setting, allows to interpret the
one-dimensional parameter α as a measure of the agent’s ambiguity aversion. Moreover,
being a convex combination of the maxmax (0-MEU) and the maxmin (1-MEU) models, it
represents a large spectrum of preferences ranging from ambiguity loving attitude of the 0-
MEU to ambiguity aversion attitude of the 1-MEU. Thus the α-MEU has been used in many
theoretical and experimental studies on agents’ ambiguity attitudes.4 Despite its popularity,
an in-depth analysis of portfolio choice and equilibrium asset prices of the α-MEU model
1Studies investigating how nonparticipation may arise in equilibrium with ambiguity averse agents include
Dow and Werlang (1992), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), Easley and O’Hara (2009), and Illeditsch (2011).
Studies relating ambiguity aversion to other market phenomena include Chen and Epstein (2002), Uppal and
Wang (2003), Trojani and Vanini (2004), Epstein and Schneider (2008), Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, and Zhang
(2011), and Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2012). For a survey on this topic see Epstein and Schneider
(2010).
2In the maxmin model any possible attitude towards ambiguity corresponds to a shrinkage of the set of
priors relative to the maximal set of priors.
3The α-maxmin expected utility is a generalization of the Hurwicz’s model introduced by Hurwicz (1951a,b);
see also Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) and Jaffray (1988).
4Theoretical properties of the α-MEU model have been studied by Ghirardato, Klibanoff, and Marinacci
(1998) and Marinacci (2002). For characterizations of subclasses of the α-MEU preferences see Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004), Olszewski (2007), Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey, and Koshevoy (2011), and
Klibanoff, Mukerji, and Seo (2014). Chen, Katusˇcˇa´k, and Ozdenoren (2007) focus on sealed bid auctions
and use the α-MEU to derive the equilibrium bidding strategy for α-MEU bidders. For recent experimental
studies see, Ahn et al. (2014), Cubitt, van de Kuilen, and Mukerji (2014) and reference therein.
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has not been carried out.5 While the maxmin model is always concave if the agent is risk
averse, this is not the case for the α-MEU model, making its analysis more involved. Such
an analysis is central to understand the attitudes towards ambiguity that the α-MEU model
represents.
This paper theoretically studies the implications for optimal portfolio choice and equilib-
rium asset prices of the α-MEU model. We study the α-MEU model in a complete Arrow–
Debreu market model where the future states of the economy correspond to draws from
Ellsberg-type urns. The complete market setting provides an ideal framework to study port-
folio choice because the agents can attain the desired amount of portfolio risk and ambiguity
exposures, given their budget constraints. The separation between risky and ambiguous
states and the interchangeability of the latter in the Ellsberg frameworks allow us to study
the attitudes towards ambiguity of α-MEU agents.
We first consider the standard Ellsberg (1961) framework where the state space consists of
three future states of the economy, one risky and two ambiguous. We find that, in this setting,
α-MEU preferences coincide with either maxmin, maxmax, or subjective expected utility
(SEU) preferences.6 This finding has implications for experimental studies. It indicates that
standard Ellsberg frameworks (with two ambiguous states) are not enough to disentangle
between maxmin and α-MEU preferences. Also, it rationalizes empirical evidence from recent
laboratory experiments. These studies are carried out in the standard Ellsberg framework
and use the α-MEU model to conclude that the experimental evidence point to a substantial
heterogeneity in aversion to ambiguity; e.g., Bossaerts et al. (2010), and Ahn et al. (2014).
Our result shows that these experimental studies could had come to the same conclusion by
using maxmin preferences and varying the size of the set of priors, rather than α, to measure
varying degrees of aversion to ambiguity.
We derive equilibrium asset prices for a market populated by ambiguity averse and SEU
5Bossaerts et al. (2010), and Ahn et al. (2014) derive the α-MEU model portfolio choice in the standard
Ellsberg framework. However, as we show in Proposition 3.1, in that framework α-MEU preferences coincide
with either maxmin, maxmax or SEU preferences.
6This result holds true for any number of risky states as long as that there are only two ambiguous states.
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investors.7 We theoretically show through which channels ambiguity aversion impacts equi-
librium asset prices, and revisit the laboratory experimental findings in Bossaerts et al.
(2010) obtained in the standard Ellsberg. We show that our theoretically derived rankings
of the state-price/state-probability ratios fully explain the empirical rankings observed by
Bossaerts et al. (2010). This remarkable matching between theory and data indicates that
ambiguity aversion does not wash out in equilibrium.
Next we consider an extended Ellsberg framework where the state space contains three
or more ambiguous states. We show that, in this setting, the α-MEU preferences do not
coincide with maxmin, maxmax or SEU preferences and yield portfolio choices that are not
observationally equivalent. We consider the set of priors Cmax that describes the uncertainty
in the extended Ellsberg framework, and denote the corresponding class of models by α-Cmax-
MEU. Fixing Cmax allows to interpret the parameter α as a measure of the agent’s aversion
toward ambiguity. Moreover, it makes the comparison between α-Cmax-MEU and maxmin
preferences meaningful by providing a utility specification common to the two classes of
models.
We show that the α-Cmax-MEU agents with α ∈ (0, 1) optimally choose only two types
of portfolios: either an unambiguous portfolio (with no exposure to ambiguity, allocating
equal wealth to all ambiguous states), or an ambiguous portfolio with one specific exposure
to ambiguity (that allocates more wealth w to one of the cheapest ambiguous state and less
equal wealth w to the other ambiguous states). The ambiguous portfolio can be seen as an
unambiguous portfolio plus a bet of w − w on one of the cheapest ambiguous states. The
larger the difference w − w, the more the portfolio is exposed to ambiguity. If there is only
one ambiguous state with minimum price, then the optimal portfolio is unique. If there are
n ≥ 1 ambiguous states with minimum price, then there are n optimal portfolios, when the
optimal portfolio is the ambiguous one. The α-Cmax-MEU agent finds equally optimal to
bet w − w on any of the n cheapest ambiguous states, because the ambiguous states with
equal prices are indistinguishable and the optimal portfolios provide the same exposure to
7Bossaerts et al. (2010) and Ahn et al. (2014) run portfolio choice experiments in the standard Ellsberg
framework and provide evidence of considerable heterogeneity in agents’ preferences. They find that one
half of the agents are well approximated by SEU preferences, while the remaining half has a significant degree
of ambiguity aversion.
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ambiguity.
The choice between unambiguous and ambiguous optimal portfolios only depends on α
and the ratio of the minimum price to the total sum of prices of ambiguous states. The
larger is α relative to the ratio above, the less the optimal portfolio is exposed to ambiguity,
i.e., the smaller is w − w. The set of state prices for which an α-Cmax-MEU agent chooses
an unambiguous portfolio increases with the ambiguity aversion parameter α. The limiting
case is the 1-Cmax-MEU agent who always chooses an unambiguous portfolio.
To understand the various attitudes toward ambiguity expressed by the α-Cmax-MEU
model, we start by considering the optimal portfolio choice when the prices of the ambiguous
states are all equal. In this setting the ambiguous states are equivalent from an informational
point of view. We show that when α is small the α-Cmax-MEU agent exhibits an ambiguity
seeking behavior. Despite the ambiguous states are equivalent, the agent prefers portfolios
exposed to ambiguity and makes the bet of w−w indifferently on one of the ambiguous states.
The number of optimal portfolios is equal to the number of ambiguous states. We show that
when α is large α-Cmax-MEU agents do not exhibit ambiguity seeking behavior, and prefer
unambiguous portfolios. Maxmin agents also prefer unambiguous portfolios irrespective of
their sets of priors.
Our theoretical findings can inform laboratory experiments to disentangle between am-
biguity seeking α-Cmax-MEU agents and agents who are not ambiguity seeking, and among
the latter, between α-Cmax-MEU and maxmin agents. We propose a multiple-stage experi-
ment. In the first stage, setting the prices of ambiguous states all equal allows to identify the
ambiguity seeking agents from their portfolio choices. Subsequent stages only involve the
non-ambiguity seeking agents, and exploit the fact that optimal portfolios of α-Cmax-MEU
agents are not unique, while the optimal portfolio of maxmin agents is unique.
Finally, we study the equilibrium when SEU agents and ambiguity sensitive agents are
both present in the market. We show that the existence of the market equilibrium depends
on whether ambiguity seeking agents are present or not in the market. We find that the
ambiguity seeking attitude of the α-Cmax-MEU agents may prevent the existence of market
equilibrium that otherwise would exist when non-ambiguity seeking α-Cmax-MEU, maxmin
and SEU agents are present. Intuitively, ambiguity seeking agents may take positions that
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cannot be offset by SEU agents.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup. Section 3 shows
that in the standard Ellsberg framework α-MEU preferences coincide with maxmin, maxmax
and SEU preferences, derives equilibrium state prices, and revisits the experimental findings
in Bossaerts et al. (2010). Section 4 studies the optimal portfolio choice of the α-Cmax-MEU
model in the extended Ellsberg framework, and the different attitudes towards ambiguity.
Section 5 concludes. The Appendix collects proofs and technical results.
2 Setup
The utility of an α-MEU agent from some state dependent wealth w = (wσ)σ∈S is
U(w) = αmin
pi∈C
∑
σ∈S
u(wσ) piσ + (1− α) max
pi∈C
∑
σ∈S
u(wσ) piσ(2.1)
where u : R → R is a utility function, the set of priors C is a closed and convex set on
the state space S, and α can take any value between [0, 1]. For α = 1, (2.1) reduces to
the maxmin-expected utility (1-MEU) model, for α = 0 to the maxmax-expected utility
(0-MEU) model. All utility functions u : R → R are differentiable, strictly concave and
strictly increasing. To keep the analysis tractable we assume that u is defined on the whole
real line. The majority of results in this paper (e.g., the α-MEU portfolio characterization in
Proposition 4.1) holds true also when u has a bounded domain, as long as the set of feasible
portfolios remain convex and the utility differentiable.8
The market model considered in this paper is an Arrow–Debreu complete market for
contingent claims with two dates, t = 0 and t = 1. S is the finite state space containing all
possible states of the economy at time t = 1, and | S | is the number of states. At time t = 0
the agents face both uncertainty (risk) and ambiguity since they neither know which state
in S will realize at time t = 1 (uncertainty), nor what is the probability of the occurrence of
some of the states in S (ambiguity). For any state there is an Arrow security traded in the
market which pays at time t = 1 one unit of currency in that state and nothing in the other
8These properties can be insured, for instance, by requiring that the feasible portfolios are in the interior of
the utility domain.
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states. Pricing rules p = (pσ)σ∈S ∈ R|S|+ are normalized so that the price of the risk-free and
unambiguous portfolio w = (1, . . . , 1) is 1, that is
∑|S|
s=1 pi = 1.
Given N agents in the market, each agent n is characterized by an initial endowment
en ∈ R|S|, where the ith coordinate of en corresponds to the number of Arrow securities
that pay in the state i, and by a criterion Un representing her preferences, n = 1, . . . , N .
The total endowment in the market is W :=
∑N
1 e
n = (W1, . . . ,W|S|), where := denotes
definition. Let · denote the scalar product x · y = ∑|S|i=1 xiyi, x, y ∈ R|S|. Given the pricing
rule p on the Arrow securities, a portfolio wn = (wnσ)σ∈S ∈ R|S| is said to be optimal for
agent n if wn satisfies the budget constraint p ·wn ≤ p · en and maximizes the utility Un over
all portfolios w ∈ R|S| subject to the budget constraint p · w ≤ p · en, i.e.
Un(wn) = max{Un(w) | w ∈ R|S|, p · w ≤ p · en}.
An equilibrium (p;w1, . . . , wN) consists of a pricing rule p and individual portfolio choices
wn such that
– for each n = 1, . . . , N the portfolio wn is optimal for agent n given the pricing rule p,
and
– the market clears:
∑N
1 w
n =
∑N
1 e
n.
3 Standard Ellsberg framework
Throughout this section we consider a standard Ellsberg framework, that is a three-dimensional
state space S = {R,G,B} where the states correspond to draws from the Ellsberg (1961)
urn. The probability of the state R (red) is known and equal to piR ∈ (0, 1), while the
probabilities of the two ambiguous states G (green) and B (blue) are unknown. Any closed
convex set of priors D, consistent with the above information on the Ellsberg framework,
can be written as
(3.1) D = {(piR, q, 1− q − piR) : q ∈ [a, b]}
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where piR, q, and 1−q−piR are the probability weights on the states R, G, and B, respectively,
corresponding to a given prior in D, and 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 − piR. Thus, any α-MEU utility U
in (2.1) on the portfolio w = (wR, wG, wB) ∈ R3 reads as
U(w) = α min
q∈[a,b]
[piR u(wR) + q u(wG) + (1− q − piR)u(wB)] +(3.2)
(1− α) max
q∈[a,b]
[piR u(wR) + q u(wG) + (1− q − piR)u(wB)]
for some α ∈ [0, 1].
3.1 Equivalence result
In the following Proposition 3.1, we show that α-MEU preferences are equivalent to either
1-MEU, 0-MEU or SEU preferences. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the utility U in (3.2) and let c := α a + (1 − α)b and d :=
(1− α)a+ α b.
(i) If α > 1/2, then U is a maxmin expected utility (1-MEU), i.e.
(3.3) U(w) = min
q∈[c,d]
[piR u(wR) + q u(wG) + (1− q − piR)u(wB)]
with set of priors C = {(piR, q, 1− q − piR) : q ∈ [c, d]} ⊂ D.
(ii) If α = 1/2, then U is a subjective expected utility (SEU) with subjective prior
(3.4) (piR, (a+ b)/2, 1− piR − (a+ b)/2).
(iii) If α < 1/2, then U is a maxmax expected utility (0-MEU), i.e.
(3.5) U(w) = max
q∈[d,c]
[piR u(wR) + q u(wG) + (1− q − piR)u(wB)]
with set of priors C = {(piR, q, 1− q − piR) : q ∈ [d, c]} ⊂ D.
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Proposition 3.1 shows that any α-MEU utility with α > 1/2 (α < 1/2) and a generic set of
priors D is equivalent to a unique maxmin utility (respectively, maxmax utility) over a set of
priors C, which is smaller than D, and univocally characterized by α and D.9 Consequently,
• the α-MEU preferences in the standard Ellsberg framework are indistinguishable from
maxmin, maxmax or SEU preferences
• doing comparative statics with respect to α in the α-MEU model with a fixed set of
prior is equivalent to doing comparative statics with respect to the size of the set of
priors in the maxmin model.
These findings provide new insights into the implications of ambiguity for portfolio choice
and have implications for experimental studies. For instance, they show that the standard
Ellsberg framework is not the right setting to study the α-MEU model if one wants to use this
model as a generalization of the maxmin, maxmax or SEU preferences.10 Moreover, they
clarify some recent experimental studies carried out in the standard Ellsberg framework
in which the α-MEU model is used to conclude that the experiment outcomes suggest a
substantial heterogeneity in aversion to ambiguity; e.g. Bossaerts et al. (2010), and Ahn et al.
(2014). Proposition 3.1 shows that these studies could have come to the same conclusions
by using maxmin preferences and varying the size of the set of priors instead of α to measure
varying degrees of aversion to ambiguity; see also Section 3.4.
The converse of Proposition 3.1 was already known from Siniscalchi (2006), namely that
a maxmin model with a given set of priors C can be rewritten as less parsimonious α-MEU
models, with set of priors D larger than C, for many different (α,D).
The α-MEU preferences coincide with maxmin, maxmax, or SEU preferences also in a
state space setting with more than one risky states, or with no risky states, as long as there
are only two ambiguous states. When there are no risky states, Proposition 3.1 holds true
by setting piR = 0. When there are m ≥ 1 risky states, R1, . . . , Rm, with known probabilities
piRi ∈ (0, 1) which satisfy
∑m
i=1 piRi < 1, Proposition 3.1 holds true by replacing the prior in
9The set of priors C equals D when α = 1 (α = 0), and when α decreases (increases) to 1/2 shrinks up to
only containing the prior (3.4).
10In Section 4 we show that when there are more than two ambiguous states the equivalence result does
not hold anymore and the α-MEU model induces different portfolio choice and expresses different attitude
toward ambiguity than the maxmin model.
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(3.4) by the prior (piR1 , . . . , piRm , (a+ b)/2, 1−
∑m
i=1 piRi − (a+ b)/2), and piR u(wR) in (3.3)
and (3.5) by
∑m
i=1 piRiu(wRi).
3.2 Market equilibrium with ambiguity averse and SEU agents
Motivated by recent experimental evidences that investor’s preferences are well approximated
by SEU and ambiguity averse preferences, we study a simple market model populated by
maxmin agents (or equivalently α-MEU agent with α > 1/2, see Proposition 3.1 (i)) and SEU
agents. We derive equilibrium asset prices and show theoretically how ambiguity aversion
impacts equilibrium asset prices.
Let denote by w = (wR, wG, wB) the optimal portfolio of a maxmin agent and by y =
(yR, yG, yB) the optimal portfolio of a SEU agent. Depending on the distribution of the total
endowment W = (WR,WG,WB) in the market, only particular rankings of state-price/state-
probability ratios can occur in equilibrium. The interesting case to study is when maxmin
agents take an unambiguous portfolio, i.e. wG = wB, and the total endowment is WG 6= WB.
Without loss of generality in the following we assume that WG > WB.
Appendix B provides the proof of Proposition 3.2 and a concise treatment of maxmin
and SEU portfolio choice.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose the market is in equilibrium and populated by maxmin agents
(equivalently α-MEU preferences with α > 1/2) who take unambiguous portfolios and SEU
agents with prior pi = (piR, piG, piB), with piR, piG, piB > 0. Denote by W = (WR,WG,WB) ∈ R3
the total endowment of the market.
1) If WR > WG > WB, then two rankings of the state-price/state-probability ratios are
possible:
(3.6)
pB
piB
>
pR
piR
>
pG
piG
and the optimal portfolios y of any SEU agent and w of any maximin agent satisfy
yG > yR > yB and wR > wG = wB.
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The other possible ranking is:
(3.7)
pB
piB
>
pG
piG
>
pR
piR
(
or
pB
piB
>
pG
piG
=
pR
piR
)
and the optimal portfolios y of any SEU agent and w of any maximin agent satisfy
yR > yG > yB (or yR = yG > yB) and wR > wG = wB.
2) If WG > WR > WB, then the only possible ranking of the state-price/state-probability
ratios is:
(3.8)
pB
piB
>
pR
piR
>
pG
piG
and the optimal portfolios y of any SEU agent and w of any maximin agent satisfy
yG > yR > yB and wR > wG = wB or wR < wG = wB.
3) If WG > WB > WR, then two rankings of the state-price/state-probability ratios are
possible:
(3.9)
pB
piB
>
pR
piR
>
pG
piG
and the optimal portfolios y of any SEU agent and w of any maximin agent satisfy
yG > yR > yB and wR < wG = wB.
The other possible ranking is:
(3.10)
pR
piR
>
pB
piB
>
pG
piG
(
or
pR
piR
=
pB
piB
>
pG
piG
)
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and the optimal portfolios y of any SEU agent and w of any maximin agent satisfy
yG > yB > yR (or yG > yB = yR) and wR < wG = wB.
Proposition 3.2 shows that when the total endowment W = (WR,WG,WB) satisfies
WR > WG > WB or WG > WB > WR, two rankings of the state-price/state-probability
ratios of the SEU agents are possible in equilibrium. In the examples of Section 3.3 we show
that all these rankings can indeed occur.
The actual occurrence of ranking (3.6) when WR > WG > WB, and of ranking (3.9)
when WG > WB > WR, show that ambiguity aversion strongly impacts equilibrium prices.
In these cases, the SEU agents in the market and the SEU representative agent (who ra-
tionalizes the market equilibrium) rank state-price/state-probability ratios in equilibrium
differently.11 Since the maxmin agents take an unambiguous portfolio, i.e. wG = wB, and
WG > WB, the market clearing implies that SEU agents have to hold portfolios which in
aggregate pay strictly more on state G than on state B12. To induce the SEU agents to clear
the supply difference WG−WB, the price of the Arrow security G in larger supply has to be
comparatively lower and the price of the Arrow security in lower supply B has to compara-
tively higher than, for instance, in a market populated only by SEU agents sharing the same
prior. When the supply differences WG −WB will be above a certain level, the SEU agents
will have to hold in equilibrium a state dependent portfolio that does not rank as the state
dependent total endowment W , and consequently their state-price/state-probability ratios
will not be ranked opposite to W . For instance, when WG > WB > WR and WG−WB is “too
large” compared to WB−WR, the optimal portfolio of the SEU agents will be yG > yR > yB
and the ranking (3.9). Examples in Section 3.3 illustrate the mechanism through which
ambiguity averse agent impacts prices in the CARA and Quadratic cases.
An ambiguity averse representative agent who rationalizes the market equilibrium may
11Rankings (3.6) and (3.9) of the state-price/state-probability ratio of SEU agents in the market are not op-
posite to the ranking of the corresponding total endowments. By contrast, the state-price/state-probability
of the SEU representative agent who rationalizes the market equilibrium is ranked opposite to total endow-
ment: the representative agent has to hold the total endowment of the economy as optimal portfolio, thus
(B.3) has to hold.
12This occurs if and only if pBpiB >
pG
piG
(See (B.3) in Appendix B) and excludes all state-price/state-probability
rankings in which pBpiB ≤
pG
piG
.
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also be possible. However, if the aggregate total endowment does not happen to be an
unambiguous portfolio, as it is in the case analyzed in Proposition 3.2, the representative
agent will need to be less ambiguity averse (that is, to have a smaller set of priors) than the
maxmin agents acting in the market.
3.3 Illustrating equilibrium results
We now illustrate Proposition 3.2 in the case of exponential and quadratic utilities. We recall
that the market is populated by SEU agents with prior pi = (piR, piG, piB), with piR, piG, piB > 0,
and by maxmin agents in (3.3) who are sufficiently ambiguity averse to hold an unambiguous
portfolio, i.e. wG = wB.
13 The total endowment W = (WR,WG,WB) is such that WG > WB.
3.3.1 CARA utility
There are L SEU agents and M maxmin agents, all having exponential utilities u(z) =
1− e−δz
δ
. Let δ = a and δ = b be the risk aversion parameter of the SEU agents and maxmin
agents, respectively. Then, the equilibrium state prices are:
pR =
piR
piR + e
ab(WR−WG)
aM+bL pi
bL
aM+bL
G q
aM
aM+bL + e
ab(WR−WB)
aM+bL pi
bL
aM+bL
B (1− piR − q)
aM
aM+bL
pG =
pi
bL
aM+bL
G q
aM
aM+bL
pi
bL
aM+bL
G q
aM
aM+bL + piRe
ab(WG−WR)
aM+bL + e
ab(WG−WB)
aM+bL pi
bL
aM+bL
B (1− piR − q)
aM
aM+bL
pB =
pi
bL
aM+bL
B (1− piR − q)
aM
aM+bL
pi
bL
aM+bL
B (1− piR − q)
aM
aM+bL + piRe
ab(WB−WR)
aM+bL + e
ab(WB−WG)
aM+bL pi
bL
aM+bL
G q
aM
aM+bL
where
(3.11) q := piG
piG + piB
piG + piBe
a
L
(WG−WB) .
The above formulae show that the equilibrium prices are the same prices that would be
obtained in a market populated only by SEU agents, L of which with prior (piR, piG, piB)
13From (B.5) and the results that follow in this section (specifically equalities (3.12)) one can see that maxmin
agents hold an unambiguous portfolio, i.e. wG = wB if and only if q in (3.11) satisfies c ≤ q < piG < d.
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and risk aversion a, and M of which with prior (piR, q, 1 − piR − q) and risk aversion b.
However, this equilibrium is significantly different than an equilibrium resulting from the
interaction of SEU agents with heterogeneous beliefs (priors). The reason is that q in (3.11)
is a function of WG −WB, of the number L of SEU agents in the market, and of their risk
aversion a.14 In particular, the dependence of q on WG−WB illustrates one channel through
which ambiguity aversion impacts asset prices. In aggregate maxmin agents do not hold the
imbalance WG −WB, which is left to the SEU agents to be absorbed.15
The impact of an increases of a
L
(WG −WB) on the securities prices that pay in the
ambiguous states is clear: an increase of a
L
(WG −WB) will decrease q and increase (1−piR−q),
and consequently will decrease pG, and increase pB.
16 The equilibrium price ratios
pG
pB
=
piG
piB
e−
a
L
(WG−WB)
pG
pR
=
piG
piR
(
piG + piB
piG + piBe
a
L
(WG−WB)
) aM
aM+bL
e−
ab
aM+bL
(WG−WR)(3.12)
pB
pR
=
piB
piR
(
piG + piB
piGe
−a
L
(WG−WB) + piB
) aM
aM+bL
e−
ab
aM+bL
(WB−WR).
show that all rankings of the state-price/state-probability ratios that are possible according
to Proposition 3.2 can indeed occur. For instance, consider the case WG > WB > WR. The
first two equations in (3.12) show that always pB
piB
> pG
piG
and pR
piR
> pG
piG
. The third equation in
(3.12) shows that both pB
piB
> pR
piR
and pB
piB
< pR
piR
can occur and, consequently, the corresponding
rankings (3.9) and (3.10).
14The fact that q does not depend neither on the number of M of maxmin agents nor on their risk aversion
b is a peculiarity of the exponential utility.
15The prior (piR, q, 1− piR − q) is the only prior in the set C of the maxmin agents which allows the L SEU
agents to clear the imbalance WG −WB and reach equilibrium.
16Depending on the particular rank of the total endowment W = (WR,WB ,WG), the price of the Arrow
security that pays in the state R will increase or decrease with aL (WG −WB).
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3.3.2 Quadratic utility
The quadratic utility with parameter c > 0 reads
(3.13) uc(x) =
x− cx
2/2, x ≤ 1/c
1/(2c), x > 1/c
and feasible portfolios live on the strictly increasing part of the utility function. Suppose
the SEU agents have utility ua, the maxmin agents utility ub and a, b > 0. The fixed point
equations for the equilibrium prices are
pR =
piR(c−WR)
c− pi ·W
pG =
piG(c−WG)
c− pi ·W
(
D − (1
b
−XMEU)(c− pi ·W )(1 + WG−WB
c−WG
piB
1−piR )
D − (1
b
−XMEU)(c− pi ·W )
)
pB =
piB(c−WB)
c− pi ·W
(
D − (1
b
−XMEU)(c− pi ·W )(1− WG−WB
c−WB
piG
1−piR )
D − (1
b
−XMEU)(c− pi ·W )
)
where c := 1
a
+ 1
b
, D := piR(c −WR)2 + (1 − piR)(c − piGWG+piBWB1−piR )2 and XMEU is the initial
wealth of the maxmin agents. Note that pG is lower (pB is higher) than the price
piG(c−WG)
c−pi·W
(respectively piB(c−WB)
c−pi·W ) that would result in a market equilibrium with SEU agents sharing
the same prior (piR, piG, piB).
Let WG > WB > WR. Figure 1 shows the state-price/state-probability ratios of the
equilibrium prices as a function of the difference WB −WR, computed for fixed WG = 272
and WR = 81
17. The parameters a and b in (3.13) are set to 0.001 in the left graph, and to
a = 0.0015 and b = 0.001 in the right graph.
[Include Figure 1 here]
In both cases there is a clear change of rankings of state-price/state-probability ratios:
as WB −WR increases, the ranking switches from (3.9) to (3.10).
17These values of the aggregate endowment W are the same values used by Bossaerts et al. (2010) in one of
their experiments that we discuss in Section 3.4 and which empirical rankings are summarized in Figure 2
in our paper.
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3.4 Revisiting laboratory experimental findings
Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) run a series of laboratory experi-
ments that reproduce a competitive financial market in the standard Ellsberg framework.
The comparison of the experimental cross sectional distribution of the security holdings and
empirical state-price/state-probability ratios, with and without ambiguity, provide clear ev-
idence that ambiguity aversion matters for portfolio choices and equilibrium prices and does
not wash out in aggregate. Bossaerts et al. (2010) summarize their experimental findings
about equilibrium asset prices in Figures 6–8; Bossaerts et al. (2010, pages 1349 and 1350).
These figures show the empirical distribution functions of the state-price/state-probability
ratios obtained from experimental sessions with different total endowments. To support
their experimental findings Bossaerts et al. (2010) use a theoretical market model involving
SEU and ambiguity averse α-MEU agents with α > 1/2. The theoretical portfolio choice
supports the experimental data. However, Bossaerts et al. (2010) do not derive the equilib-
rium prices and some of their conjectures about the equilibrium state-price/state-probability
ratio are not always supported by the data, as discussed by the authors; see Conclusion in
Bossaerts et al. (2010). In the following we show that the rankings in equilibrium of the
state-price/state-probability ratios we derive in Proposition 3.2 for a market populated by
SEU and maxmin agents fully explain and thus theoretically justify all empirical rankings
documented by Bossaerts et al. (2010). Note that the market model for which we derive
the theoretical rankings is the same theoretical market model proposed by Bossaerts et al.
(2010) to explain the experimental market.18
Figure 6 in Bossaerts et al. (2010), where the total endowment W = (WR,WG,WB) is
such WG > WR > WB, provides evidence of one ranking of the empirical state-price/state-
probability ratio, which is exactly the ranking (3.8) predicted by our Proposition 3.2. Propo-
sition 3.2 confirms the conjecture in Bossaerts et al. (2010, page 1339) that ranking (3.8) is
more likely to occur when WG > WR > WB. Indeed, this is the only theoretically possible
ranking. However, Proposition 3.2 contradicts the conjecture that no matter how the total
wealth WR ranks with respect to the total wealth in the ambiguous states, WG and WB,
18From Proposition 3.1 we know that in the standard Ellsberg framework α-MEU preferences with α > 1/2
are equivalent to maxmin preferences.
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any ranking of the state-price/state-probability ratio for the risky state pR/piR with respect
to pB/piB > pG/piG is theoretically possible; Bossaerts et al. (2010, page 1339). In fact, the
theoretically possible rankings do depend on the ranking of WR with respect to WG and WB.
Figure 2 below is a copy of Figure 8, right panel, in Bossaerts et al. (2010) where WG >
WB > WR.
[Include Figure 2 here]
The experimental findings summarized in Figure 2 provide evidence of two rankings: pR/piR >
pB/piB > pG/piG, and pB/piB > pR/piR > pG/piG.
19 Remarkably, Proposition 3.2 shows that
these are exactly the two rankings possible, namely (3.9) and (3.10), when WG > WB > WR.
Proposition 3.2 further shows that the ranking (3.10) prevails when WB −WR is large
enough to imply an optimal portfolio of the SEU agents with more Arrow securities that pay
in the ambiguous state B than in the risky state R. This provides a potential explanation
why in Figure 2 the prices do not settle in favor of one of the two rankings: the values
WR, WG, and WB in the experimental section in Figure 2 are close to the point at which the
change from (3.9) to (3.10) takes place. Example 3.3.2 illustrates this point: When WB−WR
is approximately 81, the switch of the rankings occurs as in Figure 1. This confirms that
to observe only one ranking of state-price/state-probability ratios in laboratory experiment,
the difference in aggregate wealth WB−WR should be chosen either relatively large or small.
Bossaerts et al. (2010) perform other experimental sessions in which WG > WB > WR,
summarized in Figure 7 in Bossaerts et al. (2010). Although the most common ranking
of state-price/state-probability ratios is (3.9), the empirical distribution functions of pR/piR
and pB/piB are very close. Proposition 3.2 predicts that to observe a clear separation of the
rankings in (3.9) and (3.10), the aggregate wealth WB should be chosen closer to WR or WG,
respectively.
19Bossaerts et al. (2010, Page 1351) report that “the rankings appear anomalous,” because they only expect
to see the second ranking (Bossaerts et al. 2010, Page 1339).
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4 Extended Ellsberg framework
In this section we consider an extended Ellsberg framework, that is a state space S where
the future states of the economy correspond to draws from an extended Ellsberg (1961) urn
with m risky states with known probability, and l ≥ 3 ambiguous states. A ⊂ S denotes the
set that contains the ambiguous states, thus |A| = l. The known probabilities piR ∈ (0, 1) of
risky states R ∈ S \ A satisfy ∑R∈S\A piR < 1.
As set of priors C of the α-MEU model in (2.1), we choose the set that contains all priors
consistent with the uncertainty (i.e. the risk and the ambiguity) of the extended Ellsberg
framework, namely all priors such that the probabilities on the risky states equal the known
probabilities piR, R ∈ S \ A. We call this set Cmax and denote this class of models by α-
Cmax-MEU. Fixing C = Cmax allows to interpret the parameter α as a measure of the agent’s
degree of ambiguity aversion and thereby allow for comparative statics.20 Moreover, it makes
the comparison between α-MEU and maxmin preferences meaningful by providing a utility
specification common to the two classes of models (see Section 4.4).
4.1 The α-Cmax-MEU model
The α-MEU utility in (2.1) with C = Cmax can be rewritten as
U(w) =
∑
R∈S\A
piR u(wR) + (1−
∑
R∈S\A
piR)
[
αu(wAmin) + (1− α)u(wAmax)
]
(4.1)
where wAmin and w
A
max is respectively the smallest and the largest wealth in the portfolio
w ∈ Rm+l allocated among the l ambiguous states, that is
(4.2) wAmin := min
σ∈A
wσ, and w
A
max := max
σ∈A
wσ.
20The interpretation of α could be lost by assuming a set of priors smaller than Cmax. When C is strictly
smaller than Cmax, it can reflect both additional information and less aversion towards ambiguity; see, e.g.,
Siniscalchi (2006), Gilboa and Marinacci (2013), and Machina and Siniscalchi (2014). For this reason, studies
of agent’s ambiguity aversion based on α-MEU model typically fix the set of priors equal to the one describing
the uncertainty of the setting; see, e.g., Chen et al. (2007), and Ahn et al. (2014).
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From (4.1) one can see that, when the number of ambiguous states is larger than two,
the α-Cmax-MEU utility with α ∈ (0, 1) cannot in general be rewritten neither as maxmin,
maxmax nor as subjective expected utility.21 For instance, while SEU and maxmin utilities
are always concave if u is concave, the α-Cmax-MEU utility is concave if and only if α = 1;
see Appendix C.22 Thus the equivalence result in Proposition 3.1 holds only as long as
there are only two ambiguous states. In Section 4.4 we show that, when the number of
ambiguous states is larger than two, the α-Cmax-MEU model and the maxmin model imply
also different portfolio choices. Thus, in contrast to the standard Ellsberg framework, in the
extended Ellsberg framework the α-Cmax-MEU and maxmin models are not observationally
equivalent.
4.2 The α-Cmax-MEU portfolio choice
Before stating the proposition that characterizes the portfolio choice of α-Cmax-MEU agents
we introduce few notations that we use hereafter. Given a pricing rule p ∈ Rm+l, pAmin denotes
the lowest (minimum) price among the ambiguous state prices, that is
pAmin := min
η∈A
pη
and I the set that contains all ambiguous states with lowest price, that is
I := {σ ∈ A | pσ = pAmin}.
Finally, by p˜i we denote the prior which assigns to the risky states the corresponding known
probabilities piR, R ∈ S \A, and to each ambiguous state equal probability p˜ia :=
∑
R∈S\A piR
l
.
21A way to see this is to observe that the α-Cmax-MEU utility from a portfolio w ∈ Rm+l on the ambiguous
states only depends on wAmin and w
A
max. This is not the case for a maxmin (maxmax) utility model, as
long as the state space contains more than two ambiguous states. The utility of the maxmin model from
a portfolio w ∈ Rm+l will be a function of the portfolio’s smallest wealth wAmin (respectively, the portfolio’s
largest wealth wAmax) and then, depending on the set of priors, of the second smallest wealth (respectively,
the second largest wealth) and so on, until the sum of the probabilities of the states in which these wealths
are allocated reaches (1−∑R∈S\A piR).
22Also when the set of priors C is a strict subset of Cmax, the α-MEU utility cannot in general be rewritten
neither as 1-MEU, 0-MEU nor SEU, and is not concave.
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Proposition 4.1. Suppose that the state price vector p satisfies pσ > 0 for all σ ∈ S.
Consider an α-Cmax-MEU agent. Let α ∈ (0, 1] and suppose there is an optimal portfolio.
• If
α < 1− p
A
min
1−∑R∈S\A pR = 1− p
A
min∑
ν∈A pν
(4.3)
there are |I| optimal portfolios: all optimal portfolios coincide on the risky states
whereas on the ambiguous states they only take two different values w ∈ R and w ∈ R
with w < w, which are the same for all optimal portfolios. Every optimal portfolio is
obtained by choosing a single ambiguous state ν ∈ I (pν = pAmin) among the cheapest
ones and then setting wν = wwη = w for the remaining (l − 1) ambiguous states η ∈ A \ {ν}.(4.4)
Hence, for all optimal portfolios wAmin = w and w
A
max = w.
• If
α ≥ 1− p
A
min∑
ν∈A pν
or equivalently α ≥ 1− pη∑
ν∈A pν
,∀η ∈ A,(4.5)
the optimal portfolio w is unique and unambiguous, i.e. wAmax = w
A
min. In particular,
when α = 1, the optimal portfolio w is always unique and unambiguous.
If α = 0, there is no optimal portfolio.
The proof of Proposition 4.1 is provided in Appendix D. The arguments used in the proof
show that Proposition 4.1 holds true for any α ∈ (0, 1] also when the utility u in (2.1) has
a bounded domain, as long as the set of feasible portfolios remains convex and the utility is
differentiable.23 The only difference that a utility with bounded domain would bring is the
23These properties are used in the proofs of Lemmas D.1–D.5 that in turns prove Proposition 4.1, and can
be ensured for instance by requiring that the feasible portfolios are in the interior of the utility domain.
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existence of optimal portfolios of the 0-MEU agent.24
The following example illustrates Proposition 4.1 when the state space S contains m = 1
risky state and l = 3 ambiguous states. Note that l = 3 yields pAmin ≤ 1−pR3 which is
equivalent to 1− pAmin
1−pR ≥ 2/3. From the last inequality and Condition (4.3) follow that any
agent with α ∈ (0, 2/3) prefers an ambiguous portfolio25.
Example 4.2. Let S = {R} ∪ A where A = {G,B, Y }. Consider an α-Cmax-MEU agent
and let w = (wR, wG, wB, wY ) ∈ R4 be her optimal portfolio. Without loss of generality, let
0 < pG ≤ pB ≤ pY .
• Let α ∈ (0, 2/3). Then the optimal portfolio is always exposed to ambiguity. In partic-
ular there are wR, w, w ∈ R with w > w such that:
(i) if pG < pB (p
A
min = pG and I = {G}), the optimal portfolio is unique and reads
w = (wR, w, w, w)
(ii) if pG = pB < pY (p
A
min = pG = pB and I = {G,B}), then there are two optimal
portfolios, namely (wR, w, w, w) and (wR, w, w, w)
(iii) if pG = pB = pY (p
A
min = pG = pB = pY =
1−pR
3
and I = A), then there are three
optimal portfolios: (wR, w, w, w), (wR, w, w, w), and (wR, w, w, w).
• Let α ∈ [2
3
, 1]. The optimal portfolio w is unambiguous (i.e. wG = wB = wY ) if and
only if α ≥ 1− pAmin
1−pR or equivalently α ≥ 1−
pη
1−pR ,∀η ∈ A = {G,B, Y }. This is always
the case if pG = pB = pY or if α = 1. Otherwise, i.e. if α < 1− p
A
min
1−pR , either (i) or (ii)
holds.
Proposition 4.1 and Example 4.2 show that an α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ (0, 1), facing
a state price vector p ∈ Rm+l, optimally chooses only two type of portfolios: either an unam-
biguous portfolio (with no exposure to ambiguity, allocating equal wealth in each ambiguous
24The non-existence of the optimal portfolio of 0-MEU agent is due to the fact that when the utility is
defined on the whole real line, the agent can go arbitrarily long in one of the ambiguous states and still
satisfy the budget constraint by going arbitrarily short in another ambiguous state. A utility with bounded
domain would imply the existence of an optimal portfolio for the 0-MEU agent as the bounded domain will
prevent the agent from going arbitrarily short; see Lemma D.5.
25The dependence of the portfolio choice on the number of ambiguous states l is discussed in Section 4.2.4.
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state), or an ambiguous portfolio with the specific exposure to ambiguity in (4.4), i.e. allo-
cating more wealth w to one of the cheapest ambiguous state and less equal wealth w to each
of the remaining (l − 1) ambiguous states. This portfolio can be seen as an unambiguous
portfolio with equal wealth w in each ambiguous state, plus a bet of (w − w) > 0 on one
of the cheapest state. The larger the difference w − w, the more the portfolio is exposed to
ambiguity.
The choice between unambiguous and ambiguous portfolios only depends on α and the
ratio of the lowest price among the ambiguous state prices pAmin, to the total sum of the
ambiguous state prices,
∑
η∈A pη. If (4.5) holds, the optimal portfolio is unambiguous and
unique. Otherwise if (4.3) holds, the optimal portfolio is ambiguous. The ambiguous portfo-
lio, when optimal, is unique if there is only one ambiguous state with price pAmin, i.e. |I| = 1.
If the ambiguous states with price pAmin are more than one, i.e. |I| > 1, then there are |I|
optimal ambiguous portfolios. The α-Cmax-MEU agent finds equally optimal to bet w − w
on any of the |I| cheapest ambiguous states, because ambiguous states with equal prices are
indistinguishable from an informational point of view. All optimal portfolios provide the
same exposure to ambiguity. For an illustration, see Example 4.2.
In the following we discuss the dependence of the α-Cmax-MEU agent’s optimal portfolio
on the ambiguity aversion, risk aversion and number of ambiguous states.
4.2.1 Impact of ambiguity aversion on portfolio choice
To understand how the ambiguity aversion parameter α determines the optimal exposure to
ambiguity, we rewrite the α-Cmax-MEU utility (4.1) from portfolio w ∈ Rm+l as
U(w) =
∑
R∈S\A
piRu(wR) + (1−
∑
R∈S\A
piR)
[
u(wAmin) + (1− α)(u(wAmax)− u(wAmin))
]
.(4.6)
This equation shows that the coefficient (1−α) weights the utility (u(wAmax)−u(wAmin)) that
the α-Cmax-MEU agent derives from the maximal exposure to ambiguity of the portfolio w,
that is from wAmax − wAmin. When α increases the utility from the exposure to ambiguity
decreases: when α = 0 this utility is highest, when α = 1 the utility is zero. This implies
that, the higher is α, the smaller is the exposure to ambiguity of the agent’s optimal portfolio.
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We now study how the parameter α and the utility u determine the optimal allocation
of wealth to risky and ambiguous states. Note that the optimal allocation of wealth among
the risky states only depend on the utility u; see (4.1).
Let R denote the risky state, and set m = 1 for simplicity. The following holds true.
• An increase of α decreases the demand for the ambiguous portfolio.
Inequalities (4.5) show that an increase of α decreases the set of prices for which an
α-Cmax-MEU agent prefers an ambiguous portfolio. The limit case is α = 1 in which
the optimal portfolio is always unambiguous.
• An increase of α decreases the exposure to ambiguity of the ambiguous portfolio.
This can be deduced from the first order conditions satisfied by the optimal ambiguous
portfolio (see (D.2) in Lemma D.4 when m = 1)
u′(w)
u′(w)
=
∑
ν∈A\{σ} pν
pσ
(1− α)
α
(4.7)
u′(wR)
u′(w)
=
(1− α)(1− piR)pR
pσpiR
and
u′(wR)
u′(w)
=
α(1− piR)pR∑
ν∈A\{σ} pνpiR
where σ denotes (one of) the cheapest state among the ambiguous states, i.e. σ ∈ I
and pσ = p
A
min, wσ = w and wη = w for all η ∈ A \ {σ}.
The closer α is to 0, the larger is w−w.26 When α increases, the exposure to ambiguity
of the agent’s optimal portfolio w−w decreases (as the ratio (1−α)
α
decreases). When α ↑
1− pAmin∑
ν∈A pν
, the bet w−w ↓ 0, that is the ambiguous portfolio becomes unambiguous;
see Condition (4.5).27
• When the ambiguous portfolio is optimal, an increase of α always leads to an increase
in the risk premium for the cheapest ambiguous state.
An α-Cmax-MEU agent chooses an ambiguous portfolio if and only if among the am-
biguous states there is at least one state σ (one of the chepaest ambiguous states) that
26In the limit, when α→ 0, w−w →∞, and thus there is no optimum; see discussion after Proposition 4.1.
27When α ↑ 1− pAmin∑
ν∈A pν
, 1− α ↓ pAmin∑
ν∈A pν
and thus u
′(w)
u′(w) ↓ 1.
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satifies pσ < (1− α)(1− pR); see (4.3). Hence, the larger is α, the smaller pσ must be
in order to make the agent choose an ambiguous portfolio.
Equalities (4.7) also show how α impacts the allocation of wealth between the risky state
R and the ambiguous states. An increase of α decreases the difference w − wR. When
α ↑ 1 − pAmin∑
ν∈A pν
the optimal portfolio tends to the unambiguous portfolio, and the optimal
allocation of wealth between the risky and the ambiguous states is the same as that of an
SEU with the prior p˜i.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the parameter α on the α-Cmax-MEU agent’s optimal
portfolio when the agent’s utility u in (4.1) is a CARA utility when m = 1 and l = 4.
[Include Figure 3 here]
4.2.2 Impact of risk aversion on portfolio choice
The utility function u in (4.1) that characterizes the risk aversion of the α-Cmax-MEU agent
also affects the extent to which the ambiguous portfolio in (4.4) is exposed to ambiguity.
Equalities (4.7) show that, given a state price vector p and α ∈ (0, 1), the more the utility
function u is concave (i.e. the faster u′ decreases) the smaller is the portfolio exposure w−w
to ambiguity and the difference wR −w. The dependence of the ambiguity exposure on risk
aversion is illustrated in Figure 4 assuming CARA utility. When risk aversion increases, the
agent eventually invests in the risk free asset.
[Include Figure 4 here]
4.2.3 Portfolio inertia
The α-Cmax-MEU model implies portfolio inertia both at the unambiguous and at the am-
biguous portfolio, when optimal. The reason is that the optimal portfolio choice only depends
on the values α, pAmin and
∑
η∈A pη = 1−
∑
R∈S\A pR. For example, consider the state space
S = {R, 1, 2, . . . , l} with one risky state (m = 1) denoted by R and l ≥ 3 ambiguous states
denoted respectively by 1, 2, . . . , l. Let p = (pR, p1, . . . , pl) be the state price vector in the
market.
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• Portfolio inertia at the ambiguous portfolio.
Let the state 1 be the cheapest state among the ambiguous states, that is pAmin = p1.
If (4.3) holds, that is if α < 1− p1∑
η∈A pη
= 1− p1
1−pR , the α-Cmax-MEU agent’s optimal
portfolio is w? = (wR, w, w, . . . , w) for some w > w. Even if the prices of the ambiguous
states j = 2, . . . , l change, portfolio w? remains optimal as long as pR and p1 do not
change and p1 remains the cheapest price among the ambiguous states. Thus, the set
of state price vectors for which there is portfolio inertia at w? is
{p = (pR, p1, p2, . . . , pl) ∈ Rm+l | pi ≥ p1,∀i = 2, . . . , l and
l∑
2
pi = 1− pR − p1}.
Rewriting (4.3) as pAmin < (1−α)(1− pR) shows that, the larger is α the smaller is this
set.
• Portfolio inertia at the unambiguous portfolio.
If (4.5) holds, that is α ≥ 1− pAmin∑
η∈A pη
, the α-Cmax-MEU agent’s optimal portfolio is the
unambiguous w∗ = (wR, w˜, . . . , w˜) for some w˜ ∈ R. The first order conditions satisfied
by this portfolio
piRu
′(wR)
pR
=
(1− piR)u′(w˜)
1− pR
show that pR alone determines wR and w˜. Then, even if the prices of all the ambiguous
states j = 1, . . . , l change portfolio w∗ remains optimal as long as pAmin still satisfies
(4.5) and pR does not change. Thus, the set of state price vectors for which there is
portfolio inertia at w∗ is
{p = (pR, p1, p3, . . . , pl) ∈ Rm+l | pi ≥ (1−pR)(1−α), ∀i = 1, . . . , l and
l∑
1
pi = 1−pR}.
The larger is α, the larger is this set.
4.2.4 Portfolio choice and number of ambiguous states
We now show that an α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ (0, l−1l ) always prefers the ambiguous
portfolio (4.4) and never chooses an unambiguous portfolio. The reason is that in a complete
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finite state space model when α ∈ (0, l−1
l
), Condition (4.3) is automatically satisfied. The
normalization
∑
η∈A pη +
∑
S\A pR = 1 yields
pAmin ≤
∑
η∈A pη
l
and pAmin =
∑
η∈A pη
l
⇔ pν = pη ∀ν, η ∈ A.(4.8)
As pAmin ≤
∑
η∈A pη
l
is equivalent to 1− pAmin∑
η∈A pη
≥ l−1
l
, any α ∈ (0, l−1
l
) satisfies Condition (4.3).
When ambiguous states have equal price, from the equality in (4.8) and Proposition 4.1
follow that the optimal portfolio of any α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1] is unique and
unambiguous. We formalize these concepts in the following corollaries.
Corollary 4.3. In the setting of Proposition 4.1, any α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ (0, l−1l )
always chooses a portfolio exposed to ambiguity of the type described in (4.4).
Corollary 4.4. In the setting of Proposition 4.1, suppose that the prices of the ambiguous
states are all equal, i.e. pν = pη for all ν, η ∈ A.
(i) If α ∈ (0, l−1
l
), the optimal portfolios are the ambiguous portfolios in (4.4). Since
|I| = |A| = l, the number of optimal portfolios equals the number of ambiguous states.
(ii) If α ∈ [ l−1
l
, 1], the optimal portfolio is unique and unambiguous, i.e. wAmax = w
A
min.
An increase of the number l of ambiguous states increases the interval of α-values (0, l−1
l
)
for which the corresponding α-Cmax-MEU agent always chooses a portfolio exposed to ambi-
guity. The reason is that increasing l lowers the upper bound of pAmin in (4.8) and consequently
increases the interval of α-values that satisfy (4.3). For example, setting m = 0 for simplic-
ity, when l = 4, pAmin ≤ 0.25 and the interval of α-values for which the α-Cmax-MEU agent
prefers exposure to ambiguity is (0, 0.75). While when l = 20, pAmin ≤ 0.05 and the interval
of α-values is (0, 0.95).
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we show how these results can be used in laboratory experiments
to test the α-MEU model, measure the agent’s degree of ambiguity aversion and distinguish
between α-Cmax-MEU agents and maxmin agents.
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4.3 Different attitudes towards ambiguity of the α-Cmax-MEU model
To understand the different attitudes toward ambiguity expressed by the α-Cmax-MEU model
we start with the optimal portfolio choice when the prices of the ambiguous states are all
equal. In this setting all the ambiguous states are equivalent from an informational point
of view, and thus indistinguishable.28 From Corollary (4.4) we know that when l ≥ 3 and
ambiguous state prices are equal:
• any α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ (0, l−1l ) optimally chooses an ambiguous portfolio
allocating equal wealth w on each ambiguous state plus a bet of size w − w > 0 made
indifferently on one of the l ambiguous states. The number of optimal portfolios is
equal to the number l of ambiguous states.
• any α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1] optimally chooses an unambiguous portfolio
with equal wealth in each ambiguous state. The optimal portfolio is unique.
The fact that α-Cmax-MEU agents with α < l−1l makes a bet on one among the l ambiguous
states despite these states are all indistinguishable shows an ambiguity loving (or seeking)
behavior of these agents. The ambiguity seeking behavior becomes more pronounced when
α decreases. Indeed, as shown in Section 4.2.1, the smaller is α the larger is the exposure to
ambiguity w − w in the agent’s optimal portfolio.
In contrast, α-Cmax-MEU agents, with α ≥ l−1l , do not show any ambiguity seeking behav-
ior. When facing indistinguishable ambiguous states they optimally choose an unambiguous
portfolio with equal wealth on each ambiguous state.
We observe that when α = l−1
l
, the α-Cmax-MEU agent is not equivalent, not even
observationally, to an ambiguity neutral SEU agent.29 The l−1
l
-Cmax-MEU agent and the
SEU agent with prior p˜i choose the same unambiguous portfolio when ambiguous state prices
are equal. However, the two agents choose different portfolios when the ambiguous states
28A comparatively high price in one of the ambiguous state may make the agents believe that this state has
a higher probability of occurrence than the other ambiguous states, even though in the Ellsberg framework
an exact knowledge of the probabilities is not available and the ambiguous states are “equally ambiguous”.
29In Standard Ellsberg framework, when l = 2, any α-MEU utility with α = l−1l =
1
2 reduces to a SEU
utily; see Proposition 3.1.
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with cheapest price are more than one and less than l − 1 (i.e., 1 <| I |< l − 1).30 For
example, when m = 0, l = 3, and two cheapest ambiguous states, G and B, there are two
2
3
-Cmax-MEU optimal portfolios: (wG, wB, wY ) = (w,w,w) and (wG, wB, wY ) = (w,w,w), for
some w > w. While the SEU optimal portfolio is unique and equals (yG, yB, yY ) = (y, y, y)
for some y > y.
4.4 Disentangling between α-Cmax-MEU and maxmin agents
The utility of a maxmin agent from some state dependent wealth w ∈ Rl+m is
(4.9) U(w) =
∑
R∈S\A
piR u(wR) + min
pi∈C
∑
σ∈A
piσ u(wσ)
where C ⊆ Cmax is a convex and closed set of priors. When C = Cmax this utility is equal to
the α-Cmax-MEU utility (4.1) when α = 1, and provides the maximal degree of ambiguity
aversion. Shrinking the set of priors C in (4.9) decreases the exposure to ambiguity of the
maxmin optimal portfolio, like decreasing the parameter α in (4.1) decreases the exposure
to ambiguity of the α-Cmax-MEU optimal portfolio.
The equivalence result in Proposition 3.1 shows that in the standard Ellsberg framework
(two ambiguous states, i.e., |A| = l = 2) α-MEU utilities with α > 1
2
are maxmin utilities,
and thus α-MEU preferences cannot be distinguished from maxmin preferences. In the
following we show that in an extended Ellsberg framework (three or more ambiguous states,
i.e., |A| = l ≥ 3) this distinction can instead be achieved.31 To disentangle α-MEU from
maxmin preferences we exploit the α-Cmax-MEU portfolio choice derived in Section 4.2 and
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that pσ = pη for all σ, η ∈ A. Then any maxmin agent (4.9) with a
set of priors C such that p˜i ∈ C takes an unambiguous portfolio.
This lemma shows that when facing ambiguous states with equal prices, any maxmin
30In fact, when 1 <| I |< l − 1, the optimal portfolio of any α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ [0, 1] is different
from the SEU optimal portfolio.
31In Section 4.2 we observe that the equivalence result does not hold when the number of ambiguity states
is larger than two. However, the fact that α-MEU utilities cannot be rewritten as 1-MEU utilities does not
imply that their portfolio choice may not be observationally equivalent.
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agent with a set of priors C that includes p˜i chooses a portfolio with no exposure to ambi-
guity. In Ellsberg frameworks where the ambiguous states are all “equally ambiguous” (i.e.,
indistinguishable from a probabilistic point of view) it is natural that the prior p˜i belongs to
the maxmin agent’s set of priors.32
In the following we point out the differences between the α-MEU optimal portfolio and
the maxmin optimal portfolio that may be used in a multiple-stage laboratory experiment
to disentangle ambiguity seeking from non-ambiguity seeking agents, and among the latter,
α-Cmax-MEU from maxmin agents.
4.4.1 Ambiguity seeking and non-ambiguity seeking agents
The identification of ambiguity seeking α-Cmax-MEU agents, α ∈ (0, l−1l ), and non-ambiguity
seeking agents, α-Cmax-MEU agents with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1) and the maxmin agents, can be achieved
by observing their different portfolio choices. For example, when m = 1, l = 3, and the
ambiguous states have equal prices, ambiguity seeking α-Cmax-MEU agents (α < 23) should
choose and be indifferent among the following three portfolios: (wR, w, w, w), (wR, w, w, w)
and (wR, w, w, w) for some w > w. While α-Cmax-MEU agents with α ≥ 23 and maxmin
agents should choose one (unique) unambiguous portfolio.
Implications for equilibrium market prices depend on whether ambiguity seeking agents
are present or not in the market. As shown in the following example, agents’ ambiguity
seeking behavior may prevent the existence of market equilibrium that otherwise would
exist when non-ambiguity seeking agents are in the market.
Example 4.6. Consider a market with two agents and suppose that the state dependent total
endowment W ∈ Rm+l is such that Wη = Wν, for all η, ν ∈ A.
(i) First suppose that in the market there is a SEU agent with prior p˜i and a non-ambiguity
seeking agent, i.e. either an α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1), or a maxmin agent
with p˜i ∈ C.33 It is easy to see that in this market the equilibrium exists. Specifically,
32If a set of priors C is symmetric (i.e., permutation invariant) in the ambiguous coordinates then p˜i ∈ C.
Thus, if p˜i /∈ C some ambiguous states will be systematically overweighted and other underweighted. Note
that Cmax includes p˜i and is symmetric in the ambiguous states.
33A necessary condition for the existence of the equilibrium is that beliefs are consistent across agents in the
market. We recall that p˜i is in the set of prior Cmax of the α-Cmax-MEU.
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the state price vector in equilibrium is p ∈ Rl+m with pη = 1−
∑
S\A pR
l
, ∀η ∈ A; the SEU
optimal portfolio is y ∈ Rm+l with yη = yν, ∀η, ν ∈ A, and the ambiguity averse agent’s
optimal portfolio is w ∈ Rm+l with wη = wν, ∀η, ν ∈ A, where y and w are such that
yη + wη = Wη, ∀η ∈ A.34
(ii) Now suppose that in the market, together with the SEU agent, there is an ambiguity
seeking α-Cmax-MEU agent, i.e. α ∈ (0, l−1l ). This agent only chooses ambiguous port-
folio of the type (4.4) (see Corollary 4.3), that is w ∈ Rl+1 such that wσ = w, wη = w,
∀η ∈ A\{σ}, w > w, where σ is (one of the) the cheapest ambiguous state, i.e. pσ ≤ pη,
∀η ∈ A \ {σ}. If the equilibrium exists, to clear the market, the SEU optimal portfolio
y ∈ Rl+1 has to satisfy yσ = Wσ − w < Wη − w = yη, yη = Wη − w = Wν − w = yν,
∀η, ν ∈ A \ {σ}, that is yσ < yη = yν, ∀η, ν ∈ A \ {σ}. This portfolio will is optimal
for the SEU agent only if (see (B.3)) the equilibrium state prices satisfy pσ > pη = pν,
∀η, ν ∈ A \ {σ}, but this condition is in contradiction with the α-Cmax-MEU portfolio
optimality condition pσ ≤ pη, ∀η, ν ∈ A\{σ}. This implies that there is no equilibrium
for this market.
To derive some economic intuition as to why the presence of ambiguity seeking α-Cmax-
MEU agents may prevent the existence of market equilibrium, note that in the α-Cmax-MEU
utility (4.1), (1−∑R∈S\A piR)(1−α) plays the role of the “fictitious” probability of the state
σ on which the highest wealth wAmax is allocated. The more ambiguity seeking is the agent
(i.e., the smaller is α), the higher is the probability of the state σ, and (ceteris paribus)
the higher should be the price of state σ in equilibrium. However, the portfolio optimality
condition of ambiguity seeking agents requires that σ is one of cheapest ambiguous state
in equilibrium. These potential contradicting conditions may prevent the existence of the
equilibrium.
As an illustration of this point, we specify Example 4.6 (ii) to the CARA case, i.e.,
when the utility u of both the SEU and the ambiguity seeking α-Cmax-MEU agents equal
34When the ambiguous states have equal prices, the unambiguous portfolio is optimal both for the α-Cmax-
MEU (see Corollary 4.4) and the maxmin agent (see Lemma 4.5).
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u(z) = 1− e−z
z
. In this case, the existence of equilibrium requires the state prices to satisfy:
pσ
pη
=
(
(l − 1)(1− α)
α
) 1
2
, ∀η ∈ A \ {σ}
pσ
pη
≤ 1, ∀η ∈ A \ {σ}
pη
pν
= 1, ∀η, ν ∈ A \ {σ} ∀η ∈ A \ {σ}.
Any value of α ∈ (0, l−1
l
) implies a ratio of probability of the state σ to probability of the
state η ∈ A \ {σ} strictly larger than 1, i.e., (1−α)(l−1)
α
> 1, and thus pσ > pη, which is in
contradiction with the α-Cmax-MEU portfolio optimality condition pσpη ≤ 1,∀η ∈ A \ {σ}.35
For a non-ambiguity seeking α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1), the probability (1 −∑
R∈S\A piR)(1 − α) of the state on which wAmax is allocated is bounded from above by the
probability p˜ia, and decreases when α increases. This is also true in the maxmin model.
Indeed a necessary condition for having a maxmin agent to choose the ambiguous portfolio
in (4.4) is that the prior pi∗ that realizes the minimum in (4.9) is bounded from above by
the probability p˜i.36
Because non-ambiguity seeking agents have bounded probability of the state on which the
highest wealth is allocated, and their optimal portfolios may also be unambiguous facilitate
the equilibrium prices to settle, as in Example 4.6.
4.4.2 Non-amibugity seeking and maxmin agents
Once the distinction between agents with and without ambiguity seeking attitudes is achieved,
additional experiments involving only the agents with non-ambiguity seeking attitude can be
carried out to disentangle maxmin agents from α-Cmax-MEU agents with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1). This
distinction can be achieved observing that the maxmin optimal portfolio is unique, while
35The α-Cmax-MEU utility assigns probability (1− α)(1−
∑
R∈S\A piR) to the state σ on which the highest
wealth w is allocated, and probability
α(1−∑R∈S\A piR)
(l−1) to each of the remaining states η ∈ A \ {σ}. The
SEU-prior p˜i does not apper in the inequalities characterizing the ambiguous state prices because p˜i assigns
equal probability p˜ia to each ambiguous state and thus cancels out. The total endowment W also cancels
out because Wη = Wν , for all η, ν ∈ A.
36This can be shown by observing that wσ > wη, ∀η ∈ A\{σ} implies u(wη)−u(wσ) < 0, ∀η ∈ A\{σ}. Then
the optimal prior pi∗ has to be a prior which maximizes the sum of the probability of the state η ∈ A \ {σ}.
Therefore, since p˜i ∈ C, then pi∗ is such that∑η∈A\{σ} pi∗η ≥ 1−∑S\A piRl (l−1) or equivalently pi∗σ ≤ 1−∑S\A piRl .
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the α-Cmax-MEU ambiguous optimal portfolios are not unique when there are more than one
ambiguous states with cheapest price and less than l−1, i.e., 1 <| I |< l−1.37 For example,
when m = 1, l = 3, and the state price vector p ∈ R1+3 is such that pAmin = pG = pB < pY ,
any α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1 − pG1−pR ] = [23 , 1 −
pG
1−pR ] chooses and is indifferent
between the two portfolios (wR, w, w, w) and (wR, w, w, w).
38 Thus, for instance by asking
the agents in a sequence of experimental sections to choose their optimal portfolios without
changing the prices, we expect to see the α-Cmax-MEU agent switching its choice between the
two optimal portfolios, while the maxmin agent chooses the same portfolio in any section.
The distinction between α-Cmax-MEU agents with α ∈ [ l−1l , 1) and the maxmin agents
cannot be achieved via the observation of one single portfolio choice. The reason is that
depending on her set of priors a maxmin agent may also optimally choose one of the two
portfolios which are optimal for the α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ [23 , 1− pG1−pR ], i.e., either the
portfolio (wR, w, w, w) or (wR, w, w, w). Indeed, one can show that for any given portfolio
there exists a set of priors C for which the associated maxmin agent chooses that portfolio
as optimal.
5 Conclusion
The α-MEU model has been used in many theoretical and experiemntal studies to describe
the behavior of agents under ambiguity. We show that in the standard Ellsberg framework
(two ambiguous states) α-MEU preferences coincide with either maxmin, maxmax or sub-
jective expected utility preferences, and derive equilibrium asset prices when the market is
populated by ambiguity averse and subjective expected utility investors. Our theoretical
results are strikingly in agreement with the laboratory experimental findings in Bossaerts
et al. (2010), and show why ambiguity aversion does not wash out in equilibrium.
In an extended Ellsberg framework (three or more ambiguous states) we show that the
α-MEU preferences do not coincide with maxmin, maxmax or subjective expected utility
preferences and yield portfolio choices that are not observationally equivalent. We charac-
37The optimal portfolio of a maxmin agent is typically unique. In particular this is always the case when
the maxmin utility is strictly concave.
38When pB = pG approach zero the righthand side of the interval [
2
3 , 1− pG1−pR ] approaches 1.
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terize the optimal portfolio choice of an α-Cmax-MEU agent. This agent optimally chooses
only between two types of portfolios: either an unambiguous portfolio, or an ambiguous port-
folio with one specific exposure to ambiguity (that allocates more wealth to one of cheapest
ambiguous states and less equal wealth to the other ambiguous states). The number of op-
timal ambiguous portfolios is equal to the number of ambiguous states with cheapest price.
Our theoretical findings can inform laboratory experiments to disentangle between ambigu-
ity seeking and non-ambiguity seeking agents, and among the latter, between α-Cmax-MEU
and maxmin agents. Finally, we find that when ambiguity seeking agents are present in the
market they may prevent the existence of market equilibrium that otherwise would exist
with non-ambiguity seeking agents.
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A Proof of Proposition 3.1
Let U be as in (3.2). Then it follows that indeed
U(w) =

piRu(wR) + α[au(wG) + (1− piR − a)u(wB)]+
(1− α)[bu(wG) + (1− piR − b)u(wB)] if wG ≥ wB
piRu(wR) + α[bu(wG) + (1− piR − b)u(wB)]+
(1− α)[au(wG) + (1− piR − a)u(wB)] if wG < wB
=
{
piRu(wR) + cu(wG) + (1− piR − c)u(wB) if wG ≥ wB
piRu(wR) + du(wG) + (1− piR − d)u(wB) if wG < wB
1st case: Suppose that α > 1/2. Then
cu(wG) + (1− piR − c)u(wB) ≤ du(wG) + (1− piR − d)u(wB)
whenever wG ≥ wB and
du(wG) + (1− piR − d)u(wB) ≤ cu(wG) + (1− piR − c)u(wB)
if wG < wB. Thus the assertion of Proposition 3.1 (i) follows.
2nd case: If α = 1/2, then c = d and U(ω) = u(wR) + cu(wG) + (1− piR − c)u(wB).
3rd case: If α < 1/2, similar arguments as in the first case yield the assertion of Proposi-
tion 3.1 (iii).
B Proof of Proposition 3.2
In the following, we briefly summarize how the interaction among SEU and maxmin agents
impacts the equilibrium asset prices. This will provide us the tools to prove Proposition 3.2.
Assume that (p;w1, . . . , wn) is an equilibrium with pσ > 0 for all σ ∈ {R,G,B}.Then, the
equilibrium price p satisfies
(B.1) λnp ∈ ∂Un(wn)
for some λn > 0; see (F.3). Here ∂U
n(w) denotes the supergradient of the criterion Un of
agent n at w ∈ R3. The supergradient of a SEU-agent with prior pi = (piR, piG, piB) is simply
the gradient
(B.2) ∂Un(w) = {(piRu′(wR), piGu′(wG), piBu′(wB))}.
From (B.2) and the strict concavity of the utility function follows the well known fact that
the optimal portfolio w = (wR, wG, wB) of a SEU agent is always such that the optimal
choices of state dependent wealth are ranked opposite to the state-price/state-probability
ratios, i.e.
(B.3) wσ > wν ⇔ pσ
piσ
<
pν
piν
, σ, ν ∈ {R,B,G}.
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The supergradient of an agent with maxmin (1-MEU) preferences represented as in (3.3) is
(B.4) ∂Um(w) =

{(piRu′(wR), cu′(wG), (1− piR − c)u′(wB))} if wG > wB
{(piRu′(wR), du′(wG), (1− piR − d)u′(wB))} if wG < wB
{(piRu′(wR), (λc+ (1− λ)d)u′(wG),
(1− piR − (λc+ (1− λ)d))u′(wB)) | λ ∈ [0, 1]} if wG = wB.
Using (B.1) and the shape of the supergradients we easily obtain the optimal portfolio choices
that were already derived in Bossaerts et al. (2010). In particular, from (B.4) and the strict
concavity of u it follows that
wG > wB if and only if
pG
pB
< c
1−piR−c
wG < wB if and only if
pG
pB
> d
1−piR−d
wG = wB if and only if
pG
pB
∈
[
c
1−piR−c ,
d
1−piR−d
](B.5)
where x/0 := ∞. The larger the set of priors C in (3.4), the more likely a maxmin agent
will take an unambiguous portfolio (wB = wG). In particular this will be always the case if
C = Cmax := {(piR, q, 1− q−piR) : q ∈ [0, 1−piR]}, because then the second respectively third
coordinate of the supergradient in (B.4) will be 0 if either wG > wB or wG < wB. Hence,
pσ > 0 for all σ ∈ {R,G,B} and (B.1) imply that in equilibrium this agent will only take
an unambiguous portfolios w. If c > 0 and/or d < 1 − piR in (3.4), then the multiple prior
agent may also take an ambiguous portfolio in equilibrium. We observe that a maxmin agent
holding an unambiguous optimal portfolio behaves as a SEU-agent who is not differentiating
between the ambiguous states G and B, but merges them to an unambiguous state {G,B}
with probability (1− piR). Indeed, from (B.4) and (B.1) it follows that
p{G,B}
pR
=
(1− piR)u′(w{G,B})
piRu′(wR)
{
< (1−piR)
piR
iff w{G,B} > wR
> (1−piR)
piR
iff w{G,B} < wR
(B.6)
and thus
p{G,B}
(1− piR) <
pR
piR
⇔ w{G,B} > wR(B.7)
p{G,B}
(1− piR) >
pR
piR
⇔ w{G,B} < wR (compare this to (B.3)),(B.8)
where p{G,B} := pG + pB and w{G,B} := wG = wB.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Case 1: Let WR > WG > WB. Since the 1-MEU agents take an unambiguous portfolio,
the optimal portfolio of some SEU agent must satisfy yG > yB which according to (B.3) is
equivalent to
(B.9)
pB
piB
>
pG
piG
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which only leaves the ranking of pR/piR within (B.9) an open question. Suppose that the
ranking of the ratios state-price/state-probability is as follows:
(B.10)
pR
piR
≥ pB
piB
>
pG
piG
.
Then (B.3) implies that yG > yB ≥ yR for any SEU agent, and rearranging (B.10) yields
pG + pB
1− piR =
pG + pB
piG + piB
<
pR
piR
.
Consequently, according to (B.6), we must have for each 1-MEU agent that wR < wG = wB.
But this contradicts the clearing of the market and WR > WG > WB. If the ranking is
(3.6), then we have yG > yR > yB for each SEU agent according to (B.3). Denote by
yΣ = (yΣR, y
Σ
G, y
Σ
B) the sum over all optimal portfolios of the SEU agents and similarly by
wΣ = (wΣR, w
Σ
G, w
Σ
B) the sum over all optimal portfolios of the 1-MEU agents. The market
clearing condition says Wσ = y
Σ
σ + w
Σ
σ for every σ ∈ {R,G,B}. Since yΣG > yΣR we conclude
that
wΣR = WR − yΣR > WG − yΣG = wΣG.
Thus there must be at least one 1-MEU agent who’s portfolio w = (wR, wG, wB) satisfies
wR > wG = wB which implies that (pG + pB)/pR > (1 − piR)/piR due to (B.6). But then,
again by (B.6), we must have wR > wG = wB for all 1-MEU agents. In case of (3.7) (B.3)
and (B.6) imply the claimed ranking of payoffs in the portfolios y and w.
Case 2: Let WG > WR > WB. As in case one we conclude that yG > yB. Assume that the
ranking of the ratio state-price/state-probability is as follows:
(B.11)
pR
piR
≥ pB
piB
>
pG
piG
.
Then as in case 1 it follows that yG > yB ≥ yR and wR < wG = wB which together with the
clearing of the market contradicts WR > WB. Similarly it follows that the ranking
pB
piB
>
pG
piG
≥ pR
piR
is not possible, since it would imply that yR ≥ yG > yB and wR > wG = wB due to (B.6),
again contradicting the assumed ranking of the aggregate wealth.
Case 3: Let WG > WB > WR: Suppose that
pB
piB
>
pG
piG
≥ pR
piR
then, yR ≥ yG > yB, and in view of (B.6) we obtain wR > wG = wB for every 1-MEU agent
which again contradicts the market clearing and the assumed ranking WG > WB > WR.
Again (B.3), (B.6), and the clearing of the market imply the claimed ranking of payoffs in
the portfolios y, w for the remaining possible rankings.
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C Lack of concavity of the α-MEU utility
To see the lack of concavity of the α-Cmax-MEU utility when α 6= 1, consider portfolio w1
such that w11 = 1, w
1
2 = 4 and w
1
j = 2, ∀j = 2, . . . , l, and portfolio w2 such that w21 = 1, w22 =
2, w23 = 6 and w
2
j = 2,∀j = 4, . . . , l. Let wλ = (wλ1 , . . . , wλl ) be their convex combination,
i.e. wλj = λw
1
j + (1 − λ)w2j , j = 1, . . . , l, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Take for instance λ = 1/2. Then
wλ1 = 1, w
λ
2 = 3, w
λ
3 = 4 and w
λ
j = 2,∀j = 4, . . . , l, and using (4.1)
λU(w1) + (1− λ)U(w2) = αu(1) + (1− α)1
2
(u(4) + u(6)) >
αu(1) + (1− α)u(4) = αu(wλAmin) + (1− α)u(wλAmax) = U(wλ) = U((λw1 + (1− λ)w2)).
D Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proposition 4.1 follows from Lemmas D.1–D.5 in the following.
Lemma D.1. Suppose that the state price vector p = (pσ)σ∈S satisfies pσ > 0 for all σ ∈ S.
Consider an α-Cmax-MEU agent with α ∈ (0, 1). Let w = (wσ)σ∈S ∈ Rn be an optimal
portfolio for the α-Cmax-MEU agent. Then, either w takes the same value on all ambiguous
states, or there exist two disjoint subsets A and A of the set of ambiguous states A such that
A ∪ A = A and two values w,w ∈ R such that wσ = w > w = wη for all σ ∈ A and all
η ∈ A.
Proof. Note that the only portfolio values on the ambiguous states on which the utility U
in (4.1) depends are wAmax and w
A
min. We order the set of ambiguous states A = {σ1, . . . , σl}
such that
(D.1) wσ1 ≤ wσ2 ≤ . . . ≤ wσl .
Let s be the number of strict inequalities in (D.1). Consider states ν1, . . . νs+1 ∈ A such
that wν1 < wν2 < . . . < wνs+1 . Suppose there is a state η ∈ A such that wη 6= wAmax and
wη 6= wAmin, namely suppose that s ≥ 2. We now consider the function U in (4.1) as defined
on Rm+s+1, where we merge those ambiguous states in which w takes the same value. Let
w˜ ∈ Rm+s+1 such that w˜R = wR for all risky states R ∈ S \ A and otherwise w˜σi = wσi
for i = 1, . . . , s + 1. Then, w˜ is a maximizer for the function U restricted to the open set
C := {x ∈ Rm+s+1 | xσ1 < xσ2 < . . . < xσs+1}, which we call UC , given the budget constraint
p˜ · w˜ ≤ p ·e. Here e is the initial portfolio and p˜ ∈ Rm+s+1 is obtained from p by summing up
the prices of those states which are merged when forming w˜. As UC is concave, according to
(F.3), a multiple of p˜ is in the supergradient of UC at w˜. However, this supergradient is equal
to zero in any xσi-direction, i ∈ {2, . . . , s}, because only the largest value and the smallest
value on the ambiguous states matter for U . This contradicts the assumption pσi > 0 for
i ∈ {2, . . . , s}.
Lemma D.2. Assume Lemma D.1. If pσ < pη for σ, η ∈ A, then the optimal portfolio w
satisfies wη ≤ wσ.
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Proof. Suppose that the optimal portfolio w is such that wη > wσ. Let w˜ given by w˜ν = wν
for all ν ∈ S \ {σ, η} and w˜σ = wη and w˜η = wσ. Then U(w˜) = U(w), but p · w˜ < p · w
because p · (w− w˜) = (pη − pσ)(wη −wσ) > 0. This contradicts the optimality of w, because
increasing the wealth w˜σ one could achieve a strictly higher utility while still respecting the
budget constraint.
Lemma D.3. Assume Lemma D.1. If the sets A and A associated to the optimal portfolio
w are not empty, then A = {σ} for a state σ ∈ I := {σ ∈ A | pσ = minη∈A pη}. Moreover,
any portfolio which equals w on the risky states and assigns the weight wAmax to a single state
in I and wAmin to all the other ambiguous states is optimal. Hence, there are |I| optimal
portfolios.
Proof. By contradiction suppose that there are two different states σ1 and σ2 in A, i.e. that
the optimal portfolio w is such that wσ1 = wσ2 = w
A
max, and without loss of generality
we assume that pσ1 ≤ pσ2 . Consider w˜ given by w˜η = wη for all η ∈ S \ {σ1, σ2} and
w˜σ1 = 2w
A
max−wAmin and w˜σ2 = wAmin. Then p · w˜ ≤ p ·w, so w˜ satisfies the budget constraint,
and U(w˜) > U(w) since w˜Amax = w˜σ1 > w
A
max and w˜
A
min = w
A
min. This is a contradiction to
optimality of w. Lemma D.2 implies that σ ∈ I. The last statement of the lemma follows
by observing that all these portfolios share the same price and utility.
Lemma D.4. Assume Lemma D.1 and let α < 1. Then w is unambiguous, i.e. wσ = wν for
all σ, ν ∈ A, if and only if (4.5) holds. In this case w is the only optimal portfolio. Condition
(4.5) can only be satisfied if α ≥ l−1
l
.
Proof. Suppose A = {σ} and thus A = A \ {σ}. Then, the first order conditions imply
(D.2)
pR
piRu′(wR)
=
pσ
(1− α)(1−∑R∈S\A piR)u′(wAmax) =
∑
ν∈A\{σ} pν
α(1−∑R∈S\A piR)u′(wAmin)
where R denotes any risky state among the m ones. Thus,
(D.3)
pσ∑
ν∈A\{σ} pν
=
(1− α)u′(wAmax)
αu′(wAmin)
<
1− α
α
as wAmax > w
A
min. Consequently, if there are no σ ∈ A for which (D.3) is satisfied, i.e. if
the condition (4.5) holds true, then w must be unambiguous. In order to prove necessity of
(4.5), assume that (D.3) holds for some σ ∈ A. In the following we show that in this case
the unambiguous portfolio cannot be optimal. To this end, suppose by contradiction that
the unambiguous portfolio w is optimal and let z := wAmax = w
A
min. Then  = 0 needs to
maximize the function
F : R 3  7→ αu(z − ) + (1− α)u (z + δ())
over all  ≥ 0, where δ() := 
∑
σ∈A\{σ} pν
pσ
is chosen such that the portfolio which invests
z −  in the states ν ∈ A, and z + δ() in the state σ satisfies the budget constraint (while
the investment in the risky states is unaltered). F is a concave function and the first order
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condition reads
u′(z + δ())
u′(z − ) =
α
(1− α)
pσ∑
σ∈A\{σ} pν
.
By assumption, the right hand side of the above equation is strictly smaller than 1. Hence,
F attains its optimum for  > 0, which contradicts the optimality at 0 over all  ≥ 0.
Finally, note that summing up (4.5) over all σ ∈ A yields:
α
∑
σ∈A
pσ ≥ (1− α)(l − 1)
∑
ν∈A
pν ⇔ α ≥ l − 1
l
.
Lemma D.5. Assume Lemma D.1. If α = 1, then w is unambiguous. If α = 0, then there
is no optimal portfolio.
Proof. If α = 1, then (4.1) is a maxmin agent and also p˜i ∈ Cmax. Hence, Lemma 4.5 proves
the claim.
The optimization problem of a 0-MEU agent with the maximal set of priors Cmax is∑
R∈S\A
piRu(wR) + (1−
∑
R∈S\A
piR)u(w
A
max)→ max(D.4)
subject to p · w ≤ p · e
where e denotes her initial endowment. Since the agent may go arbitrarily long in the
ambiguous state σ with wσ = w
A
max and satisfy the budget constraint by going arbitrarily
short in an other ambiguous state, the optimal value in (D.4) cannot be attained.
E Proof of Lemma 4.5
Let w be an optimal portfolio of the maxmin agent and assume that wσ 6= wη for σ, η ∈ A.
Consider the portfolio wˆ given by wˆR = wR for any risky state R ∈ S \ A and wˆσ = z for
any ambiguous state σ ∈ A where
z :=
∑
σ∈A pσ wσ∑
σ∈A pσ
=
1
l
∑
σ∈A
wσ.
The portfolio wˆ satisfies the budget constraint and
U(wˆ) =
∑
R∈S\A
piR u(wR) + (1−
∑
R∈S\A
piR)u(z)
>
∑
R∈S\A
piR u(wR) +
1
l
(1−
∑
R∈S\A
piR)
∑
σ∈A
u(wσ) ≥ U(w)
where the strict inequality follows from the strict concavity of u and the last inequality is
due to p˜i ∈ C. This contradicts the optimality of w.
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F Optimization in the partially concave case
Consider the optimization problem
(F.1) max
x∈C
U(x) subject to px ≤ pe
where C 6= ∅ is a convex subset of Rn, p, e ∈ Rn, and U : Rn → R ∪ {−∞} is a concave
function with dom U = C.
Lemma F.1. If the optimal value in (F.1) is not +∞ and if there exists at least one x¯ ∈ riC
with px¯ ≤ pe, then there is a multiplier λ ≥ 0 such that the supremum of hλ(x) = U(x) −
λp(x− e), x ∈ Rn, is finite and equal to the optimal value in (F.1). Moreover, suppose that
λ > 0 and that D is the set of points x ∈ Rn where h attains its maximum intersected with
the set of points satisfying px = pe, then D is the set of all optimal solutions to (F.1).
Proof. see Theorem 28.1 and Corollary 28.2.2 in Rockafellar (1997).
Now suppose that agent n with choice criterium Un : R|S| → R maximizes her utility
over all portfolios w ∈ R|S| satisfying the budget constraint pw ≤ pen for some p ∈ R|S| with
pi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , |S|. Furthermore, assume that an optimal portfolio wˆ exists and
that wˆ ∈ C for a convex set C ⊂ R|S| such that the restriction UnC of Un to C is concave.
Then, we may view UnC as defined on all R|S| by defining UnC(x) := −∞ for x 6∈ C, and we
are thus in the setting of Lemma F.1 where wˆ is a solution to problem (F.1) with U = UnC .
Hence, if there exists x ∈ riC with px ≤ pen, which is satisfied if for instance wˆ ∈ riC, then
there exists a multiplier λ ≥ 0 such that
(F.2) UnC(wˆ) = sup
x∈Rn
hλ(x)
with hλ as in Lemma F.1. If C = C +R+ · (1, 0, . . . , 0) and given that the utility function u
is strictly increasing we deduce that λ > 0, since otherwise
hλ(wˆ + (1, 0, . . . , 0)) = U
n
C(wˆ + (1, 0, . . . , 0)) > U
n
C(wˆ).
Moreover, any solution xˆ to the right hand side of (F.2) with pxˆ = pen is a solution to the
portfolio optimization problem, and in particular wˆ is such a solution. Additionally, for any
solution xˆ to the right hand side of (F.2) we have for all y ∈ R|S| that
UnC(y)− λp(y − en) ≤ UnC(xˆ)− λp(xˆ− en)
which shows that
(F.3) λp ∈ ∂UnC(xˆ)
where ∂UnC(w) denotes the supergradient of U
n
C at w, i.e.
∂UnC(w) := {ν ∈ R|S| | ∀y ∈ R|S|, UnC(y) ≤ UnC(w) + ν · (y − w)}.
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(a) a = b = 0.001.
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Figure 1: State-price/state-probability ratios (y-axis) of the equilibrium prices as a function of the
difference WB −WR (x-axis), computed for fixed WG = 272 and WR = 81, as in Figure 2. The line
marked with circles represents pR/piR, the one marked with arrows pointing to the right represents
pB/piB, and the one marked with arrows pointing to the left represents pG/piG. The SEU prior is
piR = piG = piB = 1/3. The parameters a and b in (3.13) are set to 0.001 in the left graph, and to
a = 0.0015 and b = 0.001 in the right graph.
Figure 2: Empirical distribution functions of state-price/state-probability ratios from the experi-
mental session of eight trading periods in Bossaerts et al. (2010) with WG = 272, WB = 162, and
WR = 81. The distribution function with circles is for pR/piR; the one with arrows pointing to the
right is for pB/piB; the one with arrows pointing to the left is for pG/piG. This figure is a copy of
Figure 8, right panel, in Bossaerts et al. (2010).
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Figure 3: Optimal state dependent wealth α-Cmax-MEU agent as a function of the degree of
ambiguity aversion α, when the number of risk states m = 1, the number of ambiguous states
l = 4, R is the risky state, and G, B, Y , Z are the ambiguous states. State prices are pR = 0.2,
pG = 0.1, and pB, pY , pZ such that pB + pY + pZ = 1− pR − pG and pG = minν∈{G,B,Y,Z} pν . The
agent’s utility u in (4.1) is a CARA utility, u(z) = 1− e−δz/δ, where δ = 1.
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Figure 4: Optimal state dependent wealth of the α-Cmax-MEU agent as a function of the degree of
risk aversion δ, when the ambiguity aversion coefficient α = 0.3, the number of risk states m = 1,
the number of ambiguous states l = 4, R is the risky state, and G, B, Y , Z are the ambiguous
states. State prices are pR = 0.2, pG = 0.1, and pB, pY , pZ such that pB + pY + pZ = 1− pR − pG
and pG = minν∈{G,B,Y,Z} pν . The agent’s utility u in (4.1) is a CARA utility, u(z) = 1− e−δz/δ.
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